COP 25: AGENDAS, DIFFERENCES AND THE FATAL OUTCOME
COP 25: AGENDAS, DIFFERENCES AND THE FATAL OUTCOME
– SUDHANVA KUMAR JM
I Year Student, OP Jindal Global Law School
The signing of the Paris Agreement, was an awakening call for the world to rectify the over emission of Carbon and our ill-treatment towards the environment. The reports submitted by the IPCC suggest human activities are estimated to have caused approximately 1.0°C of global warming above pre-industrial levels, with a likely range of 0.8°C to 1.2°C. Global warming is likely to reach 1.5°C between 2030 and 2052 if it continues to increase at the current rate.[1] The signatories to the Paris Agreement had promised various contributions towards limiting global warming to 1.5°C. The Conference of Parties has been set up to achieve the agreement and in a systematic matter resolve any issues and also to draw a virtual layout on the procedures to follow.
Importance and the Agendas of COP-25
The 2019 United Nations Climate Change Conference aimed at completing negotiations on the last outstanding issues in the ‘Katowice rulebook’ for implementing the Paris Agreement which was left inconclusive in the previous COP24. Notably the rules for international carbon markets (Article 6 of the Paris Agreement).[2] Article 6 of the Paris Agreement aims at promoting integrated, holistic and balanced approaches that will assist governments in implementing their NDCs through voluntary international cooperation. This cooperation mechanism, if properly designed, should make it easier to achieve reduction targets and raise ambition. In particular, Article 6 could also establish a policy foundation for an emissions trading system, which could help lead to a global price on carbon.[3] The costs of loss and damage linked to climate extremes are rising every day. However, there has been little global progress in finding a way to pay for these. COP 25 will be a pivotal moment to review the Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage and start implementing a just mechanism to improve the climate resilience of those most in need.[4] According to the Paris Agreement the signatory countries are supposed to update their climate plans and boost their ambitions by 2020, thus the COP 25 marked as a crucial event to ensure that the countries would be on track to deliver their promises. The COP 25 also reviewed the Lima work programme on gender which was agreed by Parties to enhance the implementation of their previous decisions to advance gender balance and integrate gender considerations into the work of Parties and the secretariat in implementing the Convention and the Paris Agreement, to achieve gender-responsive climate policy and action. The COP 25 was convened with the hope to reiterate the relevance of the climate actions and raise the ambitions of countries towards their NDCs, reflecting the significant gap between current pledges and what would be needed to meet global temperature goals.
Topics of negotiations and Differences:
In order to finalise the rule book, negotiators must navigate a thicket of impenetrable jargon, a series of technical accounting challenges and bear-traps of “constructive ambiguity” in the text, that hide often incompatible visions of how Article 6 should work and what it was created for in the first place.[5] The vulnerability to which the developing and the island countries are prone to due to the rising climatic changes, the AOSIS (Association of Small island states) constantly urged the countries to accept the Article 6, they also strongly reiterated their stand by also bringing up the San Jose Principles, signed by 31 countries, which affirm their acceptance of the terms of Article 6. Although these principles were widely resented by the LMDC (Like Minded developing Countries) and the few of the developed countries. The countries fear the issues of the transition to the new carbon market regime, the prohibition of double counting, the overall mitigation potential, accounting and governance, the market and non-market mechanism of co-operation, the use of pre-2020 units, Kyoto units and allowances in order to reduce their international and national contribution towards the Paris Agreement and also the issue of finance.[6]
Double Counting
one of the key factors to prolong the negotiations was the prohibition of Double counting. When an emissions reduction is sold to another country or a company overseas, the host nation must make an adjustment to its emissions tally to account for the transfer of savings to be used elsewhere. This is a “corresponding adjustment”.[7] if the host countries are also allowed to also take the credit for the emission reduction, this would undermine efforts to cut CO2 emissions. Although the prohibition of double counting goes unimplied, many countries have failed to follow the set standards, in order to reduce their set contributions and hinders the Agreements goals. Many signatories are suspected to practice double counting and strictly oppose the section. The split also widened as the AOSIS also demanded for the prohibition not only be used under Article 6.2 but also under article 6.4 which specifies details of non-market trades. The AOSIS argue that the accounting and the reduction of emissions, would be miscalculated if the non-market mechanism of trade is not accounted for, it could also be misappropriated by countries or organisation in pursuit of reducing their goals. Even under the presumption of agreeing to the prohibition of double counting, the question arises of how to account for trade amongst countries with different types of NDC. Given some target an emissions budget across multiple years and others aim for a particular level in a single target year. If accounted for inappropriately, then trading under Article 6.2 could have allowed countries to meet their single-year targets without actually cutting emissions.[8] The AOSIS, did not propose any solutions for the same and is an added reason for the prolonged negotiations.
Carryover of Kyoto carbon ‘units’ and projects
One of the other points of difference on the Article was the prohibition of the use of the pre-2020 units, Kyoto units and allowances. Countries such as China, India and Brazil have been generating Kyoto units under the clean development mechanism, these projects were certified emission reduction. The shift to a new mechanism would leave the ongoing projects of various companies who had invested in good faith, would incur unjust benefits, thus these countries urged to bring the pre 2020 units, and the Kyoto units under the provisions of 6.4. For some countries, weak targets or economic collapse has led to a large surplus of AAUs (Assigned Amount Units), often despite a lack of deliberate action to cut emissions. One of these countries is Australia, which says it expects to hold some 411MtCO2e of AAUs that it wants to use towards its Paris target.[9] What these countries failed to recognise is the dire need for greater ambitions and goals, According to an analysis published during the COP by think tank climate analytics: “If China and Brazil use their CERs domestically to meet their domestic NDCs, and if Australia uses its surplus AAUs towards its NDC, this would reduce global ambition by 25%.”[10] These countries have stood firm in utilising these units and allowance, while facing strong opposition by EU and vulnerable countries.
OMGE and Accounting
This issue brings up the question of the language of the article, the ambiguity in Article 6 left out for constructive policies, time and again has given the opportunity for countries to turn the rules in their favour of investments and business, while the vulnerable countries wish to achieve the goals at the earliest. The AOSIS in this regard, is ready to take up measures such as OMGE (overall mitigation in global emissions) but the governance and accounting for the proposed methods were answered with non-viable option. These countries are in desperate position for bringing changes, but the slow negotiations and adamant stands taken by the other countries, have delayed this process.
Finance and loss and damage recovery
The financial support, has not been totally coming forth, and in support of the developing countries, or the damages already caused in various countries. The WIM (Warsaw International Mechanism) was under review at COP-25, it was commissioned to compensate for the loss and damages of countries. The AOSIS and other developing countries demanded access to more additional and new funds to recover from the damages caused due to the climatic change disasters. The NGO’s and other observers found these demands to be reasonable and pertinent for the countries suffered from the disasters to regain from. Despite these efforts to gain more financial assist the draft decision at the end of the conference read in term of finance, it “urges” scale up of support by developed countries and other Parties in a position to do so, as well as private and non-governmental organizations, funds and other stakeholders; but then only invites the Green Climate Fund (GCF) Board to continue providing resources for loss and damage, and invites it to take into account, within its mandate, the strategic work streams of the WIM Executive Committee.[11] These funds are claimed to have been hard to access and quite inadequate. The loss of concern of the developed nations over this issue has pushed this issue for discussion into the next summit. Any further loses during this period are bound be not adequately compensated for and leaves the developing countries to open threats.
Outcome of the COP-25
The many splits, differences and oppositions in the negotiations, not only prolonged the conference and extinguished the last opportunity for rectification, but also ended with a weak and inconclusive approach towards tackling the climatic problems, rather than strong language setting out a clear timeline for nations to enhance their NDCs in 2020, the Saturday draft 1/CMA.2 decision text relating to the Paris Agreement merely “reiterated the invitation to parties to communicate” their plans.[12] These issues have to be further discussed in the Cop-26. According to the IPCC Climate science is clear; carbon pollution is leading to a massive ecological and humanitarian crisis. Devastating climate catastrophe can be prevented by limiting global warming to 1.5°C. This would require rapid, far-reaching and unprecedented changes in all aspects of society.[13] Thus if the summit does not complete the negotiate, monitor and control the carbon emission by the earliest, it could put the efforts of the agreements back by many years during which it would expose many of the countries to greater threats of existence and cause irreversible damages.
[1] IPCC, 2019. IPCC. [Online]
Available at: https://www.ipcc.ch/sr15/chapter/spm/
[Accessed 02 Janaury 2020].[2] European Union, 2019. European Commission. [Online]
Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/qanda_19_6650
[Accessed 02 January 2020].
[3] International Chambers of Commerce, 2019. International Chambers of Commerce. [Online]
Available at: https://iccwbo.org/media-wall/news-speeches/article-6-important/
[Accessed 02 January 2020].
[4]unclimatesummit, 2019. unclimatesummit. [Online]
Available at: https://unclimatesummit.org/
[Accessed 02 January 2020].
[5] Simon Evans, J. G., 2019. Carbon Brief. [Online]
Available at: https://www.carbonbrief.org/in-depth-q-and-a-how-article-6-carbon-markets-could-make-or-break-the-paris-agreement
[Accessed 02 January 2020].
[6] unclimatesummit, 2019. unclimatesummit. [Online]
Available at: https://unclimatesummit.org/
[Accessed 02 January 2020].
[7] Simon Evans, J. G., 2019. Carbon Brief. [Online] Available at:
https://www.carbonbrief.org/in-depth-q-and-a-how-article-6-carbon-markets-could-make-or-break-the-paris-agreement
[Accessed 02 January 2020].
[8] Simon Evans, J. G., 2019. Carbon brief. [Online]
Available at: https://www.carbonbrief.org/cop25-key-outcomes-agreed-at-the-un-climate-talks-in-madrid
[Accessed 02 January 2020].[9] Simon Evans, J. G., 2019. Carbon brief. [Online]
Available at: https://www.carbonbrief.org/cop25-key-outcomes-agreed-at-the-un-climate-talks-in-madrid
[Accessed 02 January 2020].[10] Simon Evans, J. G., 2019. Carbon brief. [Online]
Available at: https://www.carbonbrief.org/cop25-key-outcomes-agreed-at-the-un-climate-talks-in-madrid
[Accessed 02 January 2020].
[11] unclimatesummit, 2019. unclimatesummit. [Online]
Available at: https://unclimatesummit.org/
[Accessed 02 January 2020].
[12] Simon Evans, J. G., 2019. Carbon brief. [Online]
Available at: https://www.carbonbrief.org/cop25-key-outcomes-agreed-at-the-un-climate-talks-in-madrid
[Accessed 02 January 2020].[13] unclimatesummit, 2019. unclimatesummit. [Online]
Available at: https://unclimatesummit.org/
[Accessed 02 January 2020].